They’ve been fired. What will come of it?
WHEN a chief of police is suddenly dismissed, it’s bound to raise some questions. Even more so after the position of Assistant Military Commander is eliminated, and a lieutenant general is stripped of his power. If issues then spread about the ongoing reorganization taking place in military and police circles, including various analyses about the possibility of a backlash, then it is just a normal occurrence in the present era. Perhaps that’s the image which is conveyed in a period of transition: full of uncertainties.
However, uncertainty itself does not always foretell bad fortune. This is because it also promises change, whether it heads towards an improved situation, or to the contrary, falls headfirst into a more appalling condition. So, don’t be surprised if transition always has the effect of dividing people into two opposing camps: creating feelings of anxiety for those who had enjoyed a deluge of privileges, and fostering hope for those who felt that they had been sidelined in the past.
The police and military (TNI) leadership has clearly been occupied by those who, in the past, were showered with comforts. For example, General Suharto certainly took advantage of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) as the backbone of his New Order rule. For that reason, the primary measure of prestige which caused ABRI personnel to rise through the ranks was securing the implementation of Suharto’s government programs.
This doesn’t mean that all of the programs were bad. In fact, in the beginning, the militaristic style which was employed by the New Order regime obtained strong social support, whether at home or even from the Western world. Try to understand that at the time the Cold War was at its height, and opposing the communist view—which approved of any means in order to reach its objectives—with a liberal democratic system, which requires a clear flow of quality information as the foundation of its soundness, was akin to hoping that Don Quixote would attain victory in Indonesia.
At the time, many developing countries were struggling with various leftovers from their colonial period. Among them, the mastery over the productive assets of an unstable nation. It is not an easy matter to oppose a view that uses struggle between the classes as the basis of its ideology, just at the time when class differences are most apparent. Not to mention the economic condition and available technology, which makes the issue of mastering productive assets a very determining matter of high strategic value.
This challenge was answered by ABRI as the reigning authority, with the help of various doctrines which found their way straight into the required educational curriculum of military and police personnel of the New Order era. Threats to the integrity and security of the Republic of Indonesia were defined as disturbances originating from the extreme left—communists—the extreme right—theocratic Islam—and the extreme middle—liberals.
This present definition is felt to be obsolete. The communist threat has dissipated with the ending of the Cold War. The domination of information technology has made the issue of class struggle and the mastery of productive assets to have a less strategic value. Besides that, the aspirations of theocratic Islam have been increasingly marginalized by internal conflicts, as well as being increasingly sidelined in the era of globalization.
On the other hand, liberal democracy has dominated the scene in international political maneuvering and has influenced the peoples of the world to have a greater respect for human rights and environmental protection. In the end, if the old doctrines of ABRI—which is now divided into the military (TNI) and the police—are to be held on to, it means that this armed institution must confront the hegemony of liberal democracy, which has already implanted its influence upon the composition of Indonesian pro-democracy.
If this choice is taken, it clearly constitutes an act of suicide. Its signs can already be seen in everyday life, whenever police and military personnel become the targets of various social protests. Whereas, it was stated by the founders of the military, such as the late General Sudirman and A.H. Nasution: "TNI is like a fish in the waters of the people." If the people desert the military, then its downfall is just waiting at the door.
Military circles truly understand this new challenge. Since the leadership of General Wiranto, ABRI has already stated that the old paradigm which was in effect has already been abandoned, in order to fulfill the demands of the reformation period. The police have been separated from the military and their political role has been weakened from the role of ‘determiner’ to the role of ‘joining in influencing matters.’ Those who hold civil positions must select early retirement if they wish to continue with their civil career, or leave their position and return to active military duty.
This new paradigm, at the theoretic level, is indeed commendable. Unfortunately, as soon as it is applied in the field it is met with several obstacles. The main one which they face is that the large number of police and military personnel, who are presently in the levels of leadership, are precisely those who are the best advocates of the doctrines of the old ABRI paradigm, whether they are stationed in educative classes or are responsible for their realization in the field.
They—because they feel they are facing an opponent which permits any means to realize their objectives—often commit the same mistakes. Observe how various human rights violations came about from excessive military operations that were dealing with separatist movements in various parts of the country. There was also their involvement in the kidnapping and ‘rehabilitation’ of some political activists who were considered as threats to the government’s ideology. Besides that, there have been acts of collusion, corruption and nepotism, because—as a part of the authority that had been around for so long—they were finally afflicted by the feeling that they were special citizens who were somehow above the law.
It has been along this line of thinking that suspicious and uneasy individuals have filled the ranks of the police and military. Fortunately, not all of them held this attitude. Some officers have been noble enough to admit the mistakes of the past and to offer solutions which might be felt to be too radical for many of their fellow officers. However, this actually represents a moderate reaction if viewed from their interests as an institution.
It needs to be understood that the presence of an institution for retaining security and its accompanying doctrines in any one country constitutes a reaction of its people towards the threats which they perceive. The perception of the Indonesian people—even of the world—regarding this matter is undergoing a radical change. For that reason, don’t be surprised if the government of Abdurrahman Wahid must also make radical changes in determining the makeup of the new leadership in the police and military institutions.
We truly don’t have any other choice.
JK