Imagining Gus Dur’s Cabinet
Is there anything wrong with President Abdurrahman Wahid wanting the National Awakening Party (PKB) to win the 2004 general election? Of course not. However, if some people worry about what he might do attain this goal, their apprehension may be justified. Democracy grants us the freedom to determine the final outcome, but sets limits on how we must go about it, by laying predetermined ground rules.
An indication as to whether or not Abdurrahman Wahid will abide by these ground rules can be discerned by a look at the composition of his new presidential cabinet, scheduled to be announced this week. If the list of names that emerges is viewed by the public as a team that can be counted on to aid in Indonesia’s recovery from the various crises that have befallen the nation, then it will shed a positive light on Gus Dur and the future of his presidency. It will be a sign of the President’s convictions that his party will be capable of winning the election only if his government succeeds in improving the state of the nation.
On the other hand, if the composition of the new cabinet opens opportunities for the accumulation of money and power to strengthen PKB, there will be reason to worry. A choice of this nature would indicate a leader seeking a way to stay in power at any cost.
This does not mean that efforts to retain power are unjust. The management of authority, including the preservation of power, is the main duty of a government in carrying out its daily functions. However, the granting of authority is intended to be for the benefit of the people. It is important to keep an eye on those in charge of the government, so that they do not neglect their duty to the people, making it necessary to replace them if they are deemed incompetent. This is why general elections are held periodically in a democratic fashion.
The problem then is how to ensure that the general election, at much effort and cost, will result in acceptable national leaders. This is not a simple matter to address. A more basic issue must be attended to first: the determination of the will of the people—who in Indonesia number more than 200 million.
In theory, political parties are an important part of the mechanism used to group and channel society’s various aspirations. Generally speaking, those of like aspiration come together in a political party, and a party platform is formulated. Then the candidates considered most capable of realizing these aspirations are nominated to become leaders of the nation. Aspirations change due to the shifting challenges of the times. Ultimately, the replacement of personnel at the uppermost level of the government becomes necessary, and in the end is all part of the democratic routine.
In Indonesia, that routine is still far from being realized. One practice hanging on from the New Order era and proving difficult to eradicate, is that of support for the same leader, who has won election after election for three decades via a vote-gathering apparatus supported by all state organizations and institutions, and who claims legitimacy as the bearer of the people’s aspirations by means of "performance" as holder of the singular majority. The established organization has a broad network of support obtained via the co-opting of power or money. The reform movement has not been quick to dismantle this machine. Golkar, no longer ashamed to refer to itself as a "party", won second place in the voting in last year’s general election.
It is therefore not surprising that many party officials desire a similar machine. A machine that they realize will only function at its best if equipped with ammunition for the co-option of power and money. Nor is it surprising that some are worried that leaders of the present parties—including Gus Dur—may be tempted to avail themselves of it come 2004.
Indications of the power of this temptation can be seen in the haste of the parties to get their own members into the cabinet, and their common reluctance to become the political opposition. The trauma of the New Order—which effectively marginalized all strength in the opposition—is still keenly felt. We are anxious because attempts to do away with the source of this trauma are rarely voiced.
The only remedy with a chance of being effective is that whereby a budget is drawn up for contributed funds to be divided equally among the political parties, as is done in many other progressive countries. Determination of the size of the contribution would be based on the number of seats obtained, and there would exist the possibility for voluntary contributions collected for parties by their supporters. Indeed this method adds to the burden of the budget and state expenditures, but it would also mean a decrease in the potential for "political corruption" entering into the process. It would result in fairness towards parties supported by the poor, which must compete against parties supported by rich members of the business community. Likewise, a cleanup of public funds would require that the finances of parties accepting them be audited and that funds be managed in a transparent manner.
Party transparency would enable voters to make their choices more easily and more accurately. And the temptation for party leaders to acquire funding from unlawful sources could be minimized. Worries about ‘mistakes’ in the formation of the new cabinet could also be reduced, and the transformation of Indonesia into a democratic country would be facilitated.
So why don’t we get started?
Raihul Fadjri (LH/HA)