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OPINION
Dec 11-17, 2000

Syahril Sabirin: Wrong, Whatever He Does

For the first time in modern Indonesian history, a governor of the central bank who is branded a suspect in a criminal case has been able to return to work. At exactly 9:15am on Wednesday, December 6, 2000, Syahril Sabirin set foot once again onto the steps of the Bank Indonesia (BI) building on Central Jakarta's Jl. Thamrin. He had a huge smile on his face. In front of him were lots of BI staffers, all waiting to welcome the BI governor back, as well as many journalists ready to bombard him with questions. "I am fully prepared for whatever decision the House of Representatives (DPR) hands down in the future. And even if I end up losing my position, I am ready," proclaimed Sabirin, as if he were making an official announcement.

Five months of detainment—four at the Attorney General's Office and one under house arrest—have changed his life. As is the case with most bankers, Sabirin is a professional. But he's not that skilled in verbal warfare. This would be evident if he were to compete in a battle of words with either Miranda Goeltom or Anwar Nasution. He doesn't appear as forceful as other central bank governors—head of the US Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, for example, appears cold, powerful and mysterious. In fact there's nothing altogether special about him. No one would have ever guessed that he would become an overnight hero. Even so, there was no immediate outpouring of public sympathy for Sabirin when Coordinating Minister for the Economy Rizal Ramli accused him of being involved in a counterfeit money case.

But changes in one's life forge strength of character and, at the very least, make things different to what they were before. Robinson Crusoe, for example, grew into a much stronger individual on a remote island. This is what has happened to Sabirin, since being removed from his highly regarded surroundings and placed in custody. His calm but respectful response to Ramli's accusation shows that as well as having greater confidence, his verbal skills have somewhat improved. Compared to five months ago, Sabirin now appears to be ready to take part in a heavyweight boxing match, or at the very least in a battle requiring nerves of steel.

Why then liken the battle to a heavyweight boxing match? Because President Abdurrahman Wahid and his administration do not want Sabirin holding his important position, since they inherited him from the New Order. The fact that there are several ministers from the New Order regime in the current cabinet does not automatically mean they are the same as Sabirin. Perhaps some of these ministers have a synergetic relationship with the government, but Sabirin is certainly not one of them. Why then has the president not taken into account the crucial fact that Sabirin's position as head of the monetary authority during both the Suharto and Habibie eras meant that he must have had direct or at least indirect involvement in cases involving the misuse of state funds. In addition, Sabirin must have known the details of the criminal events and scandals involved with the power of the status quo. Even more crucial, however, is the fact that State Decree 23/1999 provides juridical support for Sabirin's position as the governor of the central bank.

As readers will no doubt remember, the battle began when the president offered Sabirin an ambassadorship, but this was gracefully declined. The reason Sabirin gave for not resigning as governor of the central bank was because he felt it would not have been in line with the spirit of State Decree 23/1999. This states that there is to be no interference from outside parties in BI's autonomy. His rationalism was not 100 percent true, however, because members of the BI Board of Governors can be replaced if they resign or commit criminal acts as well as in cases of total disability. Maybe Sabirin didn't want to resign because of BI's autonomy, or there could have been other reasons. Or perhaps he was just not able to accept that with a change in political power—following the fall of Suharto—automatically the governor of the central bank would have to resign. Whatever Sabirin's reason, he cannot just keep saying that he doesn't know why he was arrested.

Then the battle escalated—with Wahid/Sabirin dialogues aired in the mass media—resulting in many chins wagging about the conflict between the government and BI. The situation then worsened because everything involved, such as honor and self-esteem, was so subjective. And on June 21, 2000, at the order of the attorney general, Sabirin was officially detained and named a suspect.

If Sabirin had only possessed just a little political insight, then the conflict with the government would not have been so protracted. He could have resigned and then taken the government to court for pressuring him to step down. But this banker chose to stand his ground and this made life complicated for him because wherever he went he was surrounded by political pressure. Sabirin's current temporary victory only came about due to factors beyond his control. Ramli's strategy of shaking up the BI Board of Governors was a fatal step because there was no way the central bank would be left leaderless. Ramli's objectives of getting DPR support for three candidates for the BI Board of Governors and a debate on the proposed amendment to State Decree 23/1999 being completed before the DPR recess on December 8 have failed.

The BI 'hot cake' is now in the hands of the DPR, and for the time being it is difficult to fathom exactly what will happen in the months ahead. Amending State Decree 23/1999 is also somewhat confused because there are so many loud voices from all the political parties concerning the leadership of the central bank. If he's not careful, Sabirin, who insists on stubbornly maintaining BI's autonomy, could be brushed aside. Even though he says he is ready for this, maybe it is just hot air. Sabirin has chosen to carry on but he cannot create autonomy for BI on his own. He now faces a difficult choice because perhaps those in power don't really care about the autonomy of BI. For sure, an independent central bank cannot be built in one day, but let's hope we do not have to experience such political infighting again. It certainly does seem as if Sabirin is wrong, whatever he does.

SZ

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